Thinking science chapter 2

 

The Sensible Concept

The Mediation between subject and object

©By Abdel Hernández San Juan

Written in english and translated to english by Abdel Hernandez San Juan

    The issue of this paper on concepts as something itself is focused in discussing and developing my own scientific theory on concepts deliberating it while discussing classics pertains on concept such as Kant and Hegel. 

   With all certitude clear on the fact that the issue can be considered almost previously undiscussed and disatended I would like to recall in starting with remembering a critique developed by a sociologist about who I have taken distance but who paradoxically was in my concern clear in focusing the necessity to be critics to sustantialism in the evolution of epistemology as Pierre Bourdieu frequently did and advertised.

  Certainly, my theory of concept, conceived and developed in a deep discussion with Kant and Hegel may be characterized between several other differences by objections around sustantialists. 

   The impetus and impulse to commit myself with this theoretical endeavor about a so major issue to us as contemporary thinkers such as the concept of concepts, is motivated by the fact that to me concept can be characterized as the more disatended and even undeveloped issue we have received from tradition, an issue itself almost undiscussed with many zones of unexplored relations yet, a field of crucial things but mostly abandoned.  

   I will like to start my analysis by discussing some issues around the Hegel logic of concept in his science of logic.

  We should not forget chapter by chapter that the Hegel exposition of concept start in the science of logic with a development on what he defined as the genesis of concept and such a genesis was discussed as derived from or having its source in substance, a concept of substance Hegel assumed from the legacy of Leibniz and spinosa.

   Hegel visited the issue of the concept not only in his logic of concept tome, but through also the logic of being and the logic of essence and from the introduction between other things because the sustantialist and essentialist basis of his presuppositions as well as his dialectique mode to understand relations between pairs was usually defined by the idea that everything are moments of the same, by this reason, and considering the relevance that in general he assigned to concepts ontologically we should distinguish all the forms through which concepts are disseminated within other things which are not the source of concepts itself from the specific moments when concepts are called as something itself separated from any other thing and discussed in a more delimited form. 

   In fact, at the end of this paper I reserved a few pages to notes about things Hegel assigned to concepts which to me are not precisely related with it.

   The main moment to call concepts can be recognized within ten pages of the tome of concepts near to the beginning of the tome. 

    By focusing and discussing the main things regarded by Hegel on concepts we will perceive and identify how at the heart of his theory of concept there are several disseminations by which concepts are indistinguished from another series of notions generally related in certain form with concepts but different to it such as the "I", "conscience", perception and representation. 

  My objective in doing this revisitation of the main moments when Hegel called concepts as something itself is focused in discussing when with precision can we assume that we are certainly near to what is specific to concepts and what is not, moreover, we will recognize the specific zone that correspond to concepts while at the same time perceive that this zone seems to be however unattended and not focused as the main point from which the phenomenology of concepts source and originate and the one around which the theory of concepts should be discussed and developed in a more deeper and attentive form. 

  This is not a way to say that Hegel approach to concepts is not relevant itself, we recognize his worthy and that under him concepts received an impulse that redefined it to our days as no one thinker before him, but at the same time we will show the need to recognize how even in him the issue was vaguely attended yet and stay untheorized. 

   Let first see in his own words how Hegel discussed what he himself defined as the genesis of concepts

    "From this side concept should be before all considered in general as the thirst one in respect to being and essence, this mean the immediate and reflexión. Being and essence, by instance, are the moment of the concept becoming, but concept is the base the true of being and essence at the same time. Both are contained in concept because concept is the result of both, but both are in the concept non longer as being and essence but without returning yet to the unity of both

   The objective logic which consider being and essence constitute by the way the genetic exposition of the concept. In a more exact form, substance which is itself already real essence, essence in the unity of being have penetrated in reality. As result the concept have intself the substance as an immediate presupposition, substance represent itself what concept is as manifested. The dialectique movement of the substance through causality and reciproque action explain the immediate generation of concept, by the mediation of it, the becoming of concept is generated. But the becoming of concept have as always becoming, the meaning of being the reflection of something that trespassed its fundaments and what appear as another crossed is itself the true of concepts. In this form we see that the concept is the true of substance"

     We don’t need to much than this paragraph to immediately recognize the sustantialist basis of the Hegelian theory of concepts.

      Now well, we need to set boundaries on certain things precisely related with the indistintions mentioned above.

      In fact, when Hegel speak here on concept we can see it in a few paragraphs forth this is not precisely concept what have being clear away –even if he believe it in that manner---but before well to the undistinguished source of several notions related with concepts in diverse forms but different to concept and not related with the true phenomenology that constitute the exact place of concepts. 

   Certainly Hegel is here speaking on the source of conscience from a substantialist perspective so that he gave to the physical and chemical sources of perception, representation, conscience and self-conscience, the name of concept. The source of concepts as something itself as I will attempt to discuss further is far to correspond to this zones of ontology and is instead related with another zone we will see soon.

   In a few words, behind his words we have indistinguished a whole chain of notions related first with the pass by from the so-called sensible multiplicities we discussed before regarding ancient and classics meanings of this concept both to Hegel as before to Kant as another name to what in a modern sense we can identify as sensoriality, the universe of the datas of our physical senses presupposed under an undiferiented storm between world of sense, world of reality, the becoming of palpable sensoriality, etc., this is nothing different than the past by from feeling to perceiving it, the move from the external to the internal, from the previven multiple sensibility—another name to reality, to subjectivity, to the intuition that repit the instincts reflected in a first reflex of sensibility to conscience and from conscience to reflexion, from reflection to representation or in reverse and from representation to the progressive substitution by which things such as conscience, self-conscience, intellect and reason star to take a way, and a distance from such previous palpable sensoriality through synthesis abstractions.

   In fact, isofar as discussing his substantialist genesis of the concept a few paragraphs later Hegel start to discuss the synthetic apriori judgement of Kant stablishing his parameters around distinctions between reflexion, representation and abstraction to arrive to the final conclusion that the concept is nothing more than "the I" and is identical to it just when we realize that the German philosopher was thinking in "the I" and in conscience when he used the word concept.

   Now well, if from one side in his discussion of the genesis of the concept he was calling concept the conscience, the self conscience and "the I" and to arrive to then he previously afforded the whole chain of intuition, perception, representation and reflexión, from another side far to this ten pages, he was calling concept another chain equally unrelated with the well-defined phenomenological zone, area and or source of concepts by confusing it with judgements and syllogisms, a whole trip between subject and predicament which pertain to grammatology and language issues instead than to the concept as he to a certain point—see discussion around judgements at the end.

    What remains then of all this to the concept as something itself distinguished from whatever another chains?. Very far we will arrive through the analysis to the few paragraph in which to me we are sited in the specific phenomenological field that indeed correspond to the concept and nothing else, but before doing so we need to reconstruct yet some aspects of Hegel exposition resumed above. After a long encircle surround of words and arguments Hegel sustained:

 

      "I will limit myself here to an observation that can serve to the comprehension of concepts as developed here and facilitate to guest accurately with it, the concept when it has obtained an existence but itself it is free, and is nothing else by the I, whence it is pure conscience itself. I have without doubt concepts, I mean, some determined concepts, but the I is the pure concept, whence which as concept have reach its existence. According to this representation I have concepts, and even the concept as much as I also have a dress, a colour or certain extrinsique properties, Kant has superated this extrinseque relation of the faulty of the intellect concepts and the concept itself to arrive to the I. One of the more profound and correct opinions we may find in his critique of reason is that which affirm that the unity that constitute the concept have to be recognized as the originary unity of synthetic apperception, meaning, as a unity between I think, meaning, the self conscience. This proposition constitutes the so-called transcendental deduction of categories, but have being always considered as one of the most difficult parts of Kantian philosophy maybe not by another reason than because it requires the superation of the pure relation between I and the intellect, to go outside it toward the thought

   Object—the overline is mine we will see soon we—day Kant, is that in cuyo concept the multiple and a given intuition are unified. However, this union of representation require the unity of conscience in the synthesis of it. Whence, this unity of conscience is what constitute the relation of representation with its objects ---overlined is mine—y about which the possibility of understanding is founded. Kant distinguish the subjective unity of conscience, meaning the unity of representation, the fact that if I have a conscience of a coexistent multiplicity or a of a successive, depending on empirical conditions

   Through the categories as objective determinations, the multiple of given representations is determined in a manner that it is taken away to the unity of conscience. According to this exposition the unity of the concept is the condition by which a thing is not a pure sensible determination or a pure intuition, or also a pure representation, but an object which objective unity is the I which itself. Conceiving an object, really, consist is nothing more than in the I appropriation of it, the I penetrate it and take it away to its own form. The Object whence have its objectivity in the concept y this one is unity of self-confidence in which the object is received, its objectivity, meaning the concept, is whence nothing else but the nature of self-conscience y don’t have another moments or determinations than the I itself".

 

    We already see how from the substantialist genesis of the concept defined by the union between being and essence from which the concept become to existence the Hegel exposition of the concept continues within a chain of notions without doubt related but to use his own words nothing is being yet sustained about concept by itself and itself, meaning what concepts are as concepts and nothing else, on the one hand, in this exposition the concept become related with the relations between representation and sensible multiplicities as reality and or as datas of the sense and such a sensible multiplicity yet reflected in representation goes toward the formation of an unity defined as self-conscience and "the I" about which the concept consist, to this point nothing is ear yet on the concept itself, it is not yet a concept, but in the last three sentences Hegel mention a few notions around which the phenomenology of the concept is really based and stablished, his distinction between sensible multiplicities and an object as what become something that cant be reduced to such sensible multiplicity and the pure intuition of the senses, this is yet here not sufficiently well defined and less theorized but at least perceived and differentiated.

   Let see it overlined again but now with more emphasis in the zones, areas and issues that indeed and really start to arrive to what correspond to the specific phenomenology of the concept:

  "According to this exposition the unity of the concept is the condition by which a thing is not a pure sensible determination or a pure intuition, or also a pure representation, but an object which objective unity is the I which itself. Conceiving an object, really, consist is nothing more than in the I appropriation of it, the I penetrate it and take it away to its own form. The Object whence have its objectivity in the concept y this one is unity of self-confidence in which the object is received, its objectivity, meaning the concept, is whence nothing else but the nature of self-conscience y doesn’t have another moments or determinations than the I itself".

    Now well, this is precisely the point and the moment when we have the appearing of the object in contrast to the multiplicities and we will attempt to theorize and discuses forward how this phenomenology work and how should theorize and understand it.

   In a few words, the subject is positioned in front of the object as his otherness, as his opposite, which the subject want to know as subject of knowledge, but in the concept the object as universal abstraction acquire its true and its objectivity and in this mode the object become to the subject the objectivity of the concept   in whose  form the subject find not only to know objects but more importantly to recognize itself in between them as an object between the objects.

 But indeed, this is not as simply, rather the issue of one of mediation but in a form deeply rich and unexhausted at the phenomenological level without yet and before recognizing the potential of that relation as the main source and condition of the possibility of knowledge. 

  Before being a matter to the ontological ground of knowledge, the relation between subject, concept and object stablish the richness field of the phenomenological principle by which the concept is the sensible mediation between subject and object.

   Let see this step by step.

   First we need to might recognize that seldom the concept made pair with the object or the subject as what really made pair with the subject is the object, however, according to Hegel the apparition of object take shape with the unity of "the I" and Self conscience. I consider that this is a defect of Kant system and Hegel assumption of it.

   What we have in regard to such an attention of Kant and Hegel is nothing else but the pass by through which "the I" and the conscience become objects to the subject and whence nor only as a matter of self conscience or conscience of the conscience but also and beyond that as the distance according to which the subject start to differentiate itself by layers of the several forms that the object receives.

    On one side in respect to the subject we have an object which in respect to the sensible multiplicities –palpable sensoriality—is an otherness to the subject, this is such the world of coexistences and successions evoqued by Hegel, while taking away from the immediacy of the palpable sensoriality of the sensible multiplicities on the way to the process of perception of it as reflected and as representation we have another level or stratus in which the subject start to become object to himself, the subject as object, but in another sense the subject return to positioning itself in front of the object the subject evolutioned to be considered. 

  In this sense the object might be considered one time as the otherness of the subject, but forth such an otherness object is diluted and or disseminated within forms of the subject as object and at the same time through the layers of self-distance, the object only obtains its objectivity as object beyond be considered subjectivity in the form of the concept to the subject and finally as a mediated abstraction, only in the subject we have a concept of the object.

  Given that in Kant as well as in Hegel subjectivity is diluted according to the genesis exposition of conscience and "the I" the pass by of subjectivity is presupposed to bring with inside it the substance which was declared by them as absolute even as reality, under such a form to understand it being and essence appear as interrupting and or obstructing the pass by of non-subject things into the starting of subjective things in respect to it such as perception, representation etc, the possibility of the subject to be constituted, to have its own temporality, spatiality and mobility ontologically.

   In a few words, the subject was already there from before in its own ontological serie even before defining "the I" and conscience by which we are meaning that the relation between subject and object is older and originary than perception, representation, intuition, conscience and "the I" and more over that in respect to the concept this is a way to say that what we have is not as much the becoming of a substance through essence and being toward the unity of the I and conscience, but a subject that start the coexistence of two simultaneous becomings from the moment the object is mediated in the subject by the concept.

  The object itself, in fact, is nothing else than the so-called "sensible multiplicity" or "palpable sensoriality" world, this sensible multiplicity certainly may be considered as coexisting and it certainly persist later reflected in perception and representation but only in the concept such a sensible multiplicity become an unity and this unity is the object.

  The object is itself such a sensible multiplicity but according to how the concept mediate it to the subject, in a few words the unity and the order is operated by the concept and since it happen the main domain of relations in between is defined by the triadic principle of:

                   subject, concept and the object 

    Again the object itself is nothing more that the "sensible multiplicity" forming an unity to the subject in the concept and this unity of such a previous multiplicity in the object to the subject is mediated by the concept and only through the concept it have a sensible mediation, the concept in a few word, we will further see this in several forms, is the sensible mediator between subject and object.

  Only to a subject something is an object and there is nothing between subject and non-subjects than objects, we are then working here with a-causal notions far to the idea of genesis, this is not a way to say that causality and genesis is not itself a point of departure to the analysis of certain things, but instead to say that such a serie is not logically the one which correspond to concepts. 

  We are not here in front of the relation between essence and substance because the object itself being nothing else than the "sensible multiplicity" is already an abstraction of that multiciplity in the concept to the subject. 

  The formation of concepts is then created by the subject in concepts. Whence the Hegel exposition of the genesis of the concept explain other kind of things such as "the I", conscience and self-conscience and how under it essence, being and substance are expressed, this is not the logical serie of the source and phenomenological organization of the concept.

  This is a form to finally say that the specific phenomenological order which correspond to the concept is grounded in the relation between subject and object while not in any form, but in specific forms about which we will soon go in deep.

    How this happen?

     First we should unveil a near relation between nominalism and the concept by the mean of what object and subject seems to be or look to be meeting as abstractions, for example, when we said “being itself” we are speaking at the same time on something that is to our sensibility and feelings and something that is at the same time a concept because while we have a sensible impression about the to be of being itself such a "being itself" is already a concept, the concept "being itself".

   Moreover, in saying "being itself" we are saying, on the one hand something about a certitude we have as beings that something is itself and might be feel as such as something simply being in itself, meaning, in its pure sensibility and its pure being without yet having a distance to it more than in the pure becoming of it and its feelings, to this point "being itself" is not yet considered as a concept but as experience, but at the same time this "being itself" designe, denote and or connote such a universe of sensations and assure of experience. 

   As a word or relation between two words "being" and "itself", the name evolve a synthesis of all that field of senses and as such is a concept, the name, nominalism, and the concept are usually very nears sometimes the same while not always as we will discuss.

   From the moment the word as name is a concept all that field que word design to sensibility and experience become to the subject an object, whence what before we designed as experience and sensible assure and self-assure as soon as we see it from the subject as object to the subject, it is already a concept, then, as discussed, the name, such a nominality designing "being itself" with the semantic field of connotation to our experience it evolves is to the subject we are at the same time its object and the concept of that object.

   We should said that indeed it is an object from the moment we assure on it but granted that in this case such a something allude directly to our sensibility and experience, it is an object in ourselves, meaning we as individuals as to many individuals who have a similar experience.

  We ask if "being itself" being an object only to the subject knowledge can be in itself without the subject to which the word or the name enclose all that field of meanings to sensibility, feeling and sensoriality? and we answer that it can’t, it is both an experience and an object only to us and certainly as soon as we are not only living to be a "being itself" as when experiencing it without assuring on it but assuring it all that field become an object to us but at the same time it can’t become an object without becoming a concept at the same time, the object and the concept meet and share here as the same, nominalism and conceptualism, the same and the abstraction which transform the field of experience into a concept of an object is what make of it a concept and the opposite, the mode how the concept synthesis and resume the field of our experience and sensibility.

   Concept, of course, may be not confused with the sensible experience itself, neither the object of that becoming when assuring on it from the subject, but it is the subject the one who give configuration to that experience as object in the concept, only tthe word with all the field of experience and sensibility it suggests is a concept.

   As seen whence in naming as a nominal act when we said "being itself" two planes meets in one dimension "object and the concept", but this two planes are interrelated, the object refers to the sensible experience but the sensible experience can’t be the object without being to the subject a concept and it can less be an object without becoming concept, its then the concept the one which made the mediation between subject and object and this mediation is sensible itself in the both senses discussed above about the need to make distinctions between two levels of the sensible.

  We ask to some other what it means to you "being itself", how can you explain the consistency of that concept?, and from such a moment we conclude that all concept evolve in itself an explanation hence what make it an object is not simply its reference to an experience but what is synthetized and abstracted under it as concept in regard to an experience becoming object to the subject.

   Given than the object is formed in itself on the one hand by the sensible experience it denotes or circumscribe and at the same time it coincidence with the word-name denotating it we said that the concept operates usually in a nominal field, a field in which the name of things and things are related.

   Now well, concept in its abstraction evolve nor only an explanation, we should also assure that it evolve and suppose an intemporal dimension, meaning, an stable and continues form which define it as concept, "being itself", for example, as a concept will never be the concept of "time", "being itself" bring us addressing a well define territory of meaning on our feelings and sensations, while time as concept enclose another kind of senses evolved in that concept, each concept is then as an island of circumscribed senses as something relatibly invariable, meaning that it permanence in that form in an stable form without variations while relatibly because we always have semantical variations.

   For example, "being itself" is not the same on it as a pure abstraction referential to the pure feeling of being as a being to sensibility or if we are speaking on the "being itself" of a culture or an individual person or about the being itself of science, however, the semantique variations expand around a kernel, nucleus or center to its possible semantic variations relationalities, this is a nucleus of the concept meaning explanation.

  This hard nucleus should be distinguishdd from mere words which are not concepts but means something, a cat mean something, a certain quadrupeds animal of certain characteristics, but is neither a concept, running is not a concept and however cognnotate something, breakfast and opening the door are not concepts. 

   Certainly we can made concepts of simple words and objects by train it "as if" through the relation between name and meaning, but this words and objects are not concepts themselves.         

    To be concepts it have to acquire an intemporal dimensions and invariability that will acquire independence as abstraction to the mere nominal and will transcend the mere denotation, in a concept something will ever be a corpus of meanings that can operate without a variety of empirical issues.

    The concept of time, for example, it is nominally like any name a meeting between the concept and the empirical field of sensoriality and sensibility it evoques or detonates, but it will be something more too, time will ever be time to anyone with any experience and culture calling certain invariability of experience and certitudes to any subject intemporaly, time will ever be a hard nucleus of meanings at the same time conserved under the concept, but time will also be different things, for example, according to Aristoteles time is not a part inside the ontology of being, according to him a being never contain inside its own nature time, time in itself is not of the same nature than being, but from another perspective being mean something that is in movement to be something have to be and becoming, and as such it have to be in time so that time is also inside it, it can’t be defined without time inside it, hence we can sustain on the same concept a definition opposite to the Aristoteles one, he payed attention to certain aspects of the concept but excluding others, his perspective focused in how time is the same to different beings in time at the same time, while excluded considering how being as time is needed for it to be.

   While any concept has a hard nucleus explain it the meanings are open to variations and situational modifications and of theories around. Some concepts are more added to their nucleus, other concepts are flexible around it as for example, "being itself" already discussed, we see how it can be about the itself of a person, of a language, of a culture, of a science, etc

   A concept for example as inscription supposes the fixation of something on a surface, on a memory retained or in a body, a same general sense to completely different empirical fields, the intemporality of the concept stay the same and its name coincidence in a same surface simultaneously at different phenomena’s, the concept and its objects.

  A concept is always the field a name design the reason to recognize the relation between nominalism and conceptualism, a concept is ever be beside what such a designation mean to the subject as otherness when the concept born up as concept, meaning that a concept born up as a concept of its objects.

   In fact if we don’t have the concept subject and object are not available to exchange in between, each one stay as the otherness and opposite of the other without any relation in between or rather, in any case related in the alterity because even when the object pass by to be a subject as in the example when we represent our conscience in itself conscience just because in moving from the external to the internal of subjectivity the subject return to alterizice that relation again and transform it even being a moment of himself in an object, only through the concept the object past by to be a subject and become one with the subject inside subjectivity as alterity.

  The relation between subject and object hence whatever we are speaking on the object as otherness to the subject or the subject itself becoming object taking distance from that side of himself to turn it an object need the concept to acquire the mediation, only through the concept an object pass by to be one with the subject given that it is in the subject were the concept take shape.

   The concept itself is nothing else than the abstraction of the object, only in the concept subject and object are mutuality mediated, it is in fact the sensible mediation of one by the other both inside subjectivity when the object become one with the subject and outside before or simultaneously when the object seems to be a form of the sensible multiplicities.

   In such cases as discussed somewhere before like for example in space and time such a before outside is also in the subject in another way and in another form different to the form it acquire in conscience reflexion, or as in the case of "being itself" already discussed, nothing regarding mediations between subject and object such as those required to recognize the subject in the object and in reverse the object becoming one inside subject is possible without the mediation of the concept, and this mediation is not only abstract but sensible in the specific sense we have discussed above about the two dimensions of sensibility the one related with sensible multiplicities involved within palpable sensoriality and the one evolving inmaterialization and dematerialization, by the way only through the concept the subject can also recognize himself as an object between the objects.

  Returning to "being itself" as concept as soon as the concept is no longer that object which was by a moment an otherness and or an alterity to the assure of the subject on himself seen from the gazing of ourselves in subjectivity the object end to be by disappearing in the becoming one with the subject, it have passed by to be one and the same with subjectivity or more precisely, it have become to be from our subjectivity and as a concept of "being itself" but in this turning to be one with our subjectivity the substance is no longer there, indeed it had never ceased to be both things at the same time something outside which is itself and something the subject abstract in the becoming of an object created in front of its otherness  as self alterization in subjectivity.

   From this moment essence and substance are no longer there.

   In short, concepts are inmaterials, they are like fractal matter and inner time etters in regard to matter by analogy and nothing like substance and essence are longer there. 

  The genesis of concepts is by the way different than the genesis of conscience, self-conscience and "the I" even when they are related in certain forms inside the general theory of the formation of subject and subjectivity, the concept is already constituted and formed in manner which transform in concept the multiplicity evoqued by the object and only through the formation of the concept the mediation born up and take shape conceal and eliminate both alterity and otherness which oppose as others one and the other, subject and object.

   Certainly it can’t be figured out a way to be subjects without having conscience, self-conscience and "the I" but we might said the same in the opposite way that nothing as having conscience, self-conscience and "the I" is possible to be figured out without being subjects to objects 

   The scientific demonstration about that this genesis is simultaneous, that the subject was already there become tangible when we perceive that it is impossible to figure out a field of sensoriality coming from the palpable sensoritality of the sensible multiplicity if  is this is not already as soon as figuring it out and simultaneously a form of the subject assure.

   This subject assure in fact is no itself yet a reflect, nor a repetition reflected as a mimesis of the data of senses, no yet, but only a concept, certainly conscience and self-conscience are in general near than the subject and subjectivity to palpable sensoriality because of the reflected forms it have when images arriving from mimesis are there defining a reflexive field, but what happen with the subject in regard to such a previous sensible multiplicity of palpable sensoriality is precisely that to the subject it is not a reflect or reflected dimension, image are in fact no there as in conscience, but only objects as synthesis abstractions made by the concept which mediate sensibly in the both senses of the word tangible and intangible subject and object.

    The field of the subject is no one about reflect and reflection as in conscience but one about mediations. 

  Simply because the subject is no ever and just seldom separated from the object as another thing as conscience are in respect to its images, a conscience will ever be another thing separated from its objects by reflects and reflection, a subject instead can be object and object a subject by becoming one into the other ontologically something impossible to be considered in regard to conscience, in short, we are speaking here on parallel series as well as on a dimension theoretically almost undiscussed which is easily to be demonstrated with my theory of the self, the self itself is located between immanence and exteriorization.

    Subject and object are, and here we will now call Hegel in another sense which is that one of his negative dialectiques, the same and the opposite, each one is contained in the other and inclusive to the other, what made a subject is the existence of objects and what made an object is the existence of subjects, something is a subject because it is not an object each one need the other inside it own identity and nature and in this relation subject can be object and object subject but only through the concept. 

    In a few words, again, the relation between subject and object is a triadic one not a dyadic and triadic principles as for example sign-object and referent, are always of this kind:

                       subject-concept-object

   Both subject and object are themselves only through the concept which mediate them, the concept born up and take shape acquiring its nature to nothing else than to guaranty  and made possible this sensible mediation, the field of a concept will be ever the field of this mediation in the source and origination of its own phenomenology, the major kid of comprehension, the concept born up to solve something that can’t be resolve by conscience.

   Through some concepts the nominal proximity between naming and things is here very near and certainly this is what distinguish concepts of non-concepts, as explained above, a rose is the name of something, but not a concept, instead in the concept of art, however, in naming it we have the entrance of both things what it is itself and its name, but it is also a concept while in difference with a concept as "being itself" when both sides of the concepts the one regarding itself –sensible multiplicities or palpable sensoriality---and the side of the abstracted dimension which transform it in the concept of an object to the subject—take shape as a mutual intelligibility, something we must call heuristic concepts, in the being itself of art seen as a sensible multiplicity or palpable sensoriality and art as the name whose abstraction is a concept of what the name meet and denotate as its object we don’t have the same kind of exchange of dimensions between ontology, abstraction and concept.

  To understand art as concept without confusing it for example with "being itself" which can be the being itself of anything we need to made abstraction of the ontology of it as a substance and as an essence since from the moment asking about art as concept evolve to us a way questions on almost everything, it is not the same thinking about being, self, memory, language, conscience, etc as things itself without art than asking on it through the filter of art since thinking on it from art and to do so the concept of art seems to be seen now as the object the concept mediate as inmaterial and dematerialized while paradoxically art seen as pure matter, as substance, chemistry and physical datas is itself ontologically the opposite of such inmaterialization and dematerialization needed by the concept.

   In the concept of art we have something unique to that concept, never as in art we have the counterposition and contrast between ontology as something substantial and the concept as something desubstantiated and inmaterial, this is a way to say that each concept might be considered a universe itself in the way the concept itself call the things to be related.

  In fact if we follow substance in art maintaining ourselves near to its palpable sensoriality dimensions we can’t made abstraction of the concept, to made abstraction of the concept we have to stablish a relation between the concept and its object which should be inferred by relating the theoretical and the empirical.

  In a few words, we must reserve to each concept different ways to understand how ontology and epistemology relates under it because a concept itself as a mediator between subject and object consist precisely in it, a concept is nothing else, but an specific form to exchange both dimensions sensibly mediating subject and object.

   The concept can’t be the true manifestation of substance since a concept precisely consist about deliberating an independent free way to figure out how epistemology and ontology, subject and object, should be exchanged and related, to do so we have to admit a simultaneity between subject and object and a coexistence in a form that the form of the exchange according to the concept eliminate causality, we can’t fix the form of exchange until having defined the way the concept will operate immaterialy on the how the two sides of the field designed by the nominal is asked to be related, such a deliberation draw itself the ways the exchange should be figured out as the concept will ever consist about sensibly mediating both moments.

   The concept in fact is nothing more that the stopping of substance, it negates the causality of substance and its manifestations, it is in fact the opposite of substance manifested, on the inmaterial side of meanings it fully made abstraction of substance and works without it in the form of delivering the relation between subject and the object while on the side of the relation between the object as abstraction of a palpable sensoriality and such an empirical field, as when the concept instead of fully abandoning form and matter intervene in taking shape as for example writing or giving form to certain matter, the concept reestablish and direct how, toward what and in what direction substance should be addressed.

  As obvious in art matter languages the so called in linguistic and semiotic substance of expression is nothing else but the concept immaterially operating substance towards its own inmaterial determinations of meanings and senses.

    Substantialism in ancient, classics and even certain modern epistemologies have confused the physiology of reflects in body and conscience with the concept, it also have in its basis a confusion between conceptualizing and conceiving. 

    Conceiving can be made without any concept, while in certain kinds of things we conceive with concepts all the field of concepts in is not reduced to conceiving and the later one may occur many times without concepts in it. 

   In effect, one distinct thing is acquiring a reflect or reflecting in the mode of conscience repetitions of images in reflecting reflected sensible multiplicities something related to perception and representation and another far and different thing is forming concepts, at the same time conceptualizing is another thing different to conceiving. 

   If concept have to be deduced to the substantiality of a reality in the form of a manifestation the subject appear as a manifestation of the becoming of substance temporality and immanent essence. But that is impossible, the subject is a taking of distance to substance exposing it to be in front and beside, obligating it to be aside in front of the gaze under another different temporality which suppose the disting becoming, the one of the subject, the phenomenology of the concept belong to the subject not to substance.

  But it have a more deeper forms

  As sustained in my essays "The chrysalides of being" I agree with Hegel idea that in the last instance knowledge and science are a part in the logic of being, meaning, that the becoming of being continues evolving the becoming of thought, but at the same time, as sustained in that essay the becoming of the being of thought have consequences in the temporality of the becoming of being which is not yet the same as soon as thought appear or intervene, both are intratemporals and spatially and subject and object are simultaneous under it they goes at the same time when going and coming from one to the other is presupposing the subordination of substance to its towards.

  The event and the becoming of thought certainly involve inside it the event and the temporality of being and the opposite, but both are not the same already as soon as starting to exchange in between not if we try to look to each one being and thought separately in their own purity.

   Within its separated purity and abstraction a being can undoubtedly be without thought but such a being as simply purely a being without extrinsecation, it can’t be more that by moments or intervals because to acquire and give direction to its movement it have to assure on itself and to assure is have already to think.

  In the opposite sense we can figure out a thought without a being in it, but in such a purity of its abstraction a thought can’t address a movement it will simply stop becoming static, to be a thought have to be dynamic it have to let it be in the temporality of being or if not it will be immobilized, a thought which can’t flux in the becoming of pure being stop but the opposite too a being just being without thought become pure accidents.

    This is not a way to say that there is not knowledge in perception and representation, there is knowledge too in it without doubt as well as intellect and reason, but a way to say that concepts have its own specific phenomenology if we are really asking on what made a concept concept itself and nothing else.

     As Hegel clearly statement the concept is the apogee of thought in its own phrases something he sustained in debate with those who denigrate concepts but to be certain and proper conceptual thought take shape according to this triadic phenomenological principles as its own zone and field of operations two opposite’s subject and object and a sensible mediator in between the concept from which all the opposites are solved and solutioned, otherness, alterities and contradictions.

  From the moment concepts start to operate all exclusions are transformed into inclusions and the externals extrinsiques become transformed into internals intrinsiques becoming one with the other. 

  It is curious and amazing but at the same time comprehensible in his age, how Hegel, the thinker who more than any one before him advanced the science of concept, was not capable in his age to advertise, recognize and discover this dialectique. His age was not ready yet even in his genius to unveil it.

   The relation between subject and object thanks to the concept is generative and productive.

 

Bibliography

Hegel Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, Science of Logic London: George Allen & Unwin, 1929, translated by W. H. Johnston and L. G. Struthers, translated by Henry S. Macran (Hegel's Logic of World and Idea) (Bk III Pts II, III only). Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1929translated by A. V. Miller; Foreword by J. N. Findlay. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1969, Prometheus; Later Printing edition (December 1, 1991), Humanity books, translated by George di Giovanni, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010

Hegel, Cual es el comienzo de la ciencia, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete

Hegel, Ciencia de la Lógica, Lógica del ser, Lógica de la Esencia, Lógica del Concepto, Hachete

Hegel, lógica del concepto, Ciencia de la Lógica, Hachete